

# The Case of Brazil and Others in Latin America

---

**Private investment in electricity transmission in Africa**

**Luiz Barroso\***

luiz@psr-inc.com

**April 2025**



\*With a tremendous help from Amanda Fernandes and Rodrigo Novaes from PSR



# AGENDA

1. About us
2. The Brazilian system
3. The Brazilian ITP model at a glance
4. Some practical implementation aspects
5. Other cases in Latin America
6. Common questions and conclusions



# PSR

PSR integrates consulting studies,  
development of advanced analytical tools  
and research of new methodologies on  
energy systems

Our team has 150 people with degrees in  
optimization, energy systems, statistics and  
computer/data science

We work in more than 70 countries in all  
continents

[www.psr-inc.com](http://www.psr-inc.com)





# Some topics presented here have been well researched

4

## Planning for Big Things in Brazil

Planning and Building Large-Scale Transmission Networks in Competitive Hydrothermal Systems: Technical and Regulatory Challenges

by Luiz A. Barroso, Fernando Porrua, Luiz M. Thomé, and Mario V. Pereira



Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MPE.2007.447613

54 IEEE power & energy magazine

1540-7977/07/\$25.00©2007 IEEE

september/october 2007

By Rafael de Sá Ferreira, Hugh Rudnick, and Luiz Barroso

TRANSMISSION SYSTEM EXPANSION BOOMED IN several South American countries in the 2000s and the early 2010s. Network capacity additions were required to cope with fast-growing electricity demand, prompted by average gross domestic product growth rates of around 5% per year in 2003–2008 and 3% per year in 2008–2013. Following a trend verified in most infrastructure segments, private sector participation in transmission investments increased significantly in the period, which was the result of reforms in the electricity industry that had initiated in the 1990s.

In some of the largest electricity systems in Latin America, these reforms included common elements for the transmission segment: centralized and determinative transmission expansion planning by national-level governmental institutions, combined with decentralized implementation and operation of transmission assets, by agents selected by means of auctions for transmission concessions.

This model experienced great success, but it is currently facing challenges also common to several South American countries. Some of the most important problems are rooted in transmission implementation. Acquisition of rights-of-way and environmental licensing issues are resulting either in centrally planned expansion remaining on paper longer than the central planner would wish or, when the concessions to implement and operate the assets are acquired, in the frustration of the expectations of investors, who may be exposed to cost overruns in implementation or the financial consequences of delays.

## The Expansion of Transmission

Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MPE.2016.2547281  
Date of publication: 16 June 2016


54 IEEE power & energy magazine

1540-7977/16©2016IEEE

july/august 2016

## Flexible Connections

SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR A SMALL PORTION OF global greenhouse gas emissions (GHE), as seen in Figure 1, which shows the percentage of worldwide GHE originating in Brazil (1.35%), Argentina (0.64%), Chile (0.24%), and Peru (0.13%). While the low level of GHE is partially due to the relatively low level of economic development of these nations, the main reason is the region's very clean electricity supply mix, with about 50% of installed capacity coming from hydropower sited in the large rivers crossing the continent. The South American region is also among the most promising lands for the development of nonconventional renewable energy (NCRE), encompassing all renewables except large hydro. The strong and persistent wind flows, availability of suitable sites, and thousands of sunny hours a year provide a significant



54 IEEE power & energy magazine

1540-7977/12/\$31.00©2012 IEEE

## Solutions and Challenges for the Integration of Renewables in South America

- ✓ From the security-of-supply perspective, NCRE provides the opportunity to diversify the current generation mix, currently heavily based on large hydro facilities.
- ✓ From an economic perspective, there is a strategic objective of diversifying the generation mix, particularly in countries dependent on foreign energy supplies.
- ✓ Finally, from a portfolio management standpoint, the lack of a coherent policy

potential for several types of NCRE. In addition, the region's hydro reservoirs can easily smooth out production fluctuations of intermittent (wind and solar) or seasonal (biomass) energy sources, thus providing operational flexibility and facilitating their reliable and economic integration.

The participation of NCRE in the region's energy matrix has been increasing. The most relevant options are small hydroelectric plants (considered as NCRE) and wind, solar, and biomass power plants, especially cogeneration plants using sugar cane bagasse. Load factors of 40–45% for wind power are common in some countries. NCRE turns out to be attractive due to a number of factors that are not strictly related to emissions reduction:

for environmental licensing and strong regulatory actions against reservoirs often lead to delays in the construction of conventional hydro plants, which can affect supply reliability. In contrast, renewable generation is usually spread out over several plants with smaller capacities, which provides a "portfolio" effect and thus a hedge against project delays. Also, NCRE construction time is short (about 18 months) in contrast to at least five years for conventional hydro. This allows flexibility in the entrance of new capacity—a valuable hedge against the region's load growth uncertainty.

Certain support mechanisms for NCRE have been in place in the South American region for the past ten years, typically in the form of fiscal or tax incentives for renewable development in states or municipalities. At the beginning of the last decade, Brazil and Argentina implemented costly subsidies (similar to the feed-in tariffs in Europe) to foster renewables. Afterwards, with the implementation of long-term auctions for energy contracts to attract new generation beginning in 2004, auctions gained momentum and also started to be used in several countries as the main explicit support scheme for NCRE beginning in 2007. Auctions function as an indirect price discovery mechanism, and they also result in the right amount of investment and reduce risk aversion with long-term contracting. Moreover, auctions provide transparent and efficient outcomes that are unlikely to be challenged in the future as political and institutional scenarios change. This is the case in Brazil and Peru, where renewable auctions complement the regular auctions to attract conventional generation. Argentina and Uruguay have also implemented specific auction processes to attract NCRE. Chile has opted for a compulsory quota scheme placed on the generators (they have to demonstrate that part of the energy contracted is being supplied by NCRE). Explicit support mechanisms

By Hugh Rudnick, Luiz A. Barroso, Daniel Llaens, David Watts, and Rafael Ferreira

march/april 2012

IEEE power & energy magazine 25


# Brazilian electricity sector deregulation at a glance

---


- Middle-income country, electricity demand growth rates at 5%+ per year
- First market reform in 1997, Brazil adopted the “standard model”, led by the UK back then (“spot pricing theory”)
- Major energy rationing in 2001 due lack of generation investments
- Successive regulatory and policy reviews since 2002 until what we have now:
  - Combination of planning and competition to bring investments to serve load growth
  - Cost-based dispatch by an Independent System Operator
  - Decentralized generation investment decisions, centralized transmission planning and investment decisions
  - Competition “for the market”:
    - Technology-specific contract auctions and marketplaces for contract negotiations complement spot market to drive generation investments
    - Independent transmission projects framework
    - Industry that is almost 100% private over the value chain (G, T and D)

# Brazil's supply mix is highly renewable and interconnected


The 200,000 km high-voltage transmission grid is part of the portfolio of complementary renewable generation sources to serve load growth, reliability and resilience



**Supply mix 2024 (% installed capacity of 220,000 MW)**



**Renewable output profile  
(monthly production in % of yearly average – 2017 to 2024)**



# The transmission **business model** in a nutshell

7

## CENTRALIZED Planning & Operation



**Least cost transmission expansion planning:** selection of transmission facilities that maximize systemic benefits

**Least cost generation dispatch:** optimize the use of system resources


## DESCENTRALIZED ASSETS IMPLEMENTATION via Transmission Auctions



### Efficiency through competition “for the market”

- ✓ Responsibility for construction and O&M assigned to private companies through auctions
- ✓ Price discovery for CAPEX and rate of return


# Institutional framework





# Long-term concessions awarded through public auctions (revenue cap model), transmission is recognized as infrastructure



9



[1] RAP stands for Annual Allowed Revenue (*Receita Anual Permitida*, in Portuguese).

[2] Revisions, which consist in updating the regulatory cost of debt and operating & maintenance costs, are intended to share potential gains derived from technological improvements or better macroeconomic conditions with the public.

In the last 16 years, approximately 86,000 km of high-voltage lines and 223k MVA have been auctioned (~ USD 40 billion in new investments)<sup>10</sup>



# This framework allowed an efficient expansion of grid

**In 2012**



**97,000 km of transmission lines**



**73 different transmission companies**



**Biggest players in terms of revenue**

#	Transmission Company
1	FURNAS
2	ISA-CTEEP
3	CHESF
4	ELETRONORTE
5	ELETROSUL

**In 2024**



**189,000 km of transmission lines**



**239 different transmission companies**




**Biggest players in terms of revenue**

#	Transmission Company
1	FURNAS
2	CHESF
3	ISA-CTEEP
4	ELETRONORTE
5	TAESA




# The selection process for transmission projects

*The Ministry of Mines and Energy, based on studies by EPE and ONS, defines which projects will be implemented*



# Detailed process until auction



# From auction to contract: key phases in the process




## PUBLIC CONSULTATION

Project reports and the draft bidding notice are made available to the public, encouraging open discussion and questions.



## APPROVAL OF RESULTS

ANEEL certifies the technical and finance qualifications of the winning company.





# Rights of way, and environmental licenses: after the concession contract is granted

15


## Right Acquisition Framework

- ✓ **Public Utility Declaration (DUP):** legal instrument issued by ANEEL that enables land acquisition or right-of-way for transmission projects.
- ✓ **Land use rights:** companies must prioritize friendly negotiations for property purchase or right-of-way; compensation to landowners is mandatory. Lawsuits may happen if a friendly deal is not reached, discussions usually around compensations. Regulatory provision to alleviate penalties for delays due to lengthy negotiations with landowners.
- ✓ **Regulatory framework:** governed by Decree-Law 3,365/1941 and Laws 9,074/1995.

## Environmental licenses

- ✓ **Three-stage licensing process:** transmission projects must obtain Preliminary (LP), Installation (LI), and Operating (LO) licenses.
- ✓ **Flexibility depending on impact level:** LP can be granted based on different studies that demand different complexity (and time consuming) (RAS, RAA, or EIA/RIMA), depending on the project's environmental impact.
- ✓ **Delays are common:** caused by complex studies, coordination with multiple institutions, and land or vegetation permitting—often considered a risk factor for investors. Alleviation of regulatory penalties defined on a case by case basis.

# Example of transmission auction: 2025



- Tender documents and other technical information in a Public consultation from April 4, 2025 to May 19, 2025
- Auction date: October 31, 2025
- 11 lots, 1200 km
- About 4,000 MW of transformation capacity
- Estimated investment: 1,4 billion USD
- Deliveries in 42 to 60 months
- Include 4 lots won by a company in a 2020 auction but not delivered (concession intervened by ANEEL, are being reaucted now under a slightly different planning approach)

# Example of T auction: 2025

Informações sobre os lotes previstos para o Leilão nº 4/2025				
LOTE	DESCRIÇÃO	UF(S)	PRAZO (MESES)	FUNÇÃO DO EMPREENDIMENTO
1	Sublote 1A:	SP	60	Atendimento à Região Metropolitana de São Paulo – Sub-regiões Norte, Leste e Sul.
1A	- LT 345 kV Miguel Reale - Centro, C1 e C2, com 5,72 km (subterrânea)			
1B	Sublote 1B:  - LT 345 kV Norte - Miguel Reale, C3 e C4, com 14,5 km cada (subterrânea). (Possível caducidade)			
2	- LT 500 kV Santa Luzia II - Bom Nome II, C1, CS, com 228 km.  - LT 230 kV Caxias II - Teresina II C1, CS, com 92 km;  LT 230 kV Teresina - Teresina III C1, com 14 km (reaproveita faixa da LT 230 kV Teresina - Piripiri C1 a ser desativada);  SE 230 kV Caxias II - Controle Automático Rápido de Reativos – CARR (-50/50) Mvar.	PB/PE/MA/PI	54	Escoamento de geração na área Leste da região Nordeste.  Atendimento às regiões leste do estado do Maranhão e centro-norte do estado do Piauí.
3	- SE 525/138 kV Erechim <sup>(2)</sup> - (6+1 Res) x 50 MVA;  - SE 230/69 kV Boa Vista do Buricá 2 - (6+1Res) x 33,33 MVA;  - Trechos de LT 525 kV entre a SE Erechim e a LT 525 kV Itá - Caxias Norte C1, com 2 x 1,5 km;  - Trechos de LT 230 kV entre a SE Boa Vista	PR/RS	48	Atendimento às cargas da região noroeste do Rio Grande do Sul e aumento de confiabilidade.  Atendimento Elétrico ao Estado do Rio Grande do Sul: Região Metropolitana de Porto Alegre.  Atendimento à região noroeste do Paraná.

LOT	DESCRIPTION	STATE	TIME TO COD (MONTHS)		REASON FOR THE ASSET
LOTE	DESCRIÇÃO	UF(S)	PRAZO (MESES)	FUNÇÃO DO EMPREENDIMENTO	
5	- LT 230 kV Itapaci - Matrinchã 2, C1, com 146,6 km;  - LT 230 kV Matrinchã 2 - Firminópolis, C1, com 138,3 km;  - SE 230/138 kV Matrinchã 2 - (6+1Res) x 50 MVA	GO	48		Atendimento às regiões de Itapaci, Firminópolis e Matrinchã, no estado de Goiás.
6	Sublote 6A:	MG	42	Aumento da capacidade do sistema de transmissão com a implantação de compensadores síncronos na área Minas Gerais	
6A	- SE 500 kV Nova Ponte 3 - Compensações Síncronas 2 x (-200/+300) Mvar;				
6B	Sublote 6B:  - SE 500 kV Paracatu 4 - Compensação Síncrona 1 x (-200/+300) Mvar.				
11	- SE 500 kV Açú III - Compensações Síncronas 2 x (-200/+300) Mvar;	RN	42	Aumento da capacidade do sistema de transmissão com a implantação de compensadores síncronos na área Rio Grande do Norte.	
11A	- SE 500 kV João Câmara III - Compensação Síncrona 1 x (-200/+300) Mvar.				
11B					

Observações: (1) Os sublotes 1A/1B, 6A/6B e 11A/11B não são interdependentes entre si e poderão ser apregoados individualmente.



# Some further issues of practical implementation

● International interconnectors are quasi-ITP but treated out of the national ITP-scheme

● The Brazilian National development Bank (“BNDES”) has had a relevant role in financing transmission

● Brazil has a long track-record on least-cost development transmission plans

● The environmental licensing process is far from being easy and (still) has many challenges

● The ITP framework has evolved over time to deal with bad outcomes, examples:

- Systematic increase of empty lots in the auctions due to issues with environmental licensing process
- Delays in the transmission implementation schedules
- Mismatches between G & T expansion

# National Development Bank (BNDES) role in the Development of Transmission

19

Long-term financing for large projects




Stimulating private participation



Supporting system expansion



Fostering equipment nationalization (requirements on LDC)



For many years, the Brazilian Government's borrowing cost (**SELIC**) was higher than BNDES' lending rate (**TJLP**). Now all rates are marketbased




BNDES acts as a major catalyzer of funding at competitive rates:

- In 2021, BNDES issued the country's first loan with green certification, and it was granted to a transmission company.
- Last week, BNDES announced that it raised 190 million dollars from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to support investments in transmission and biofuels

# Some lessons: reduction in competition during 2012-16

## The Problem

Delays in environmental licensing became a systematic problem in the transmission sector, raising investors' perception of risk → **increase of empty lots in the auctions in 2012**



## The Solution

### Regulatory + Planning effort to decrease investors risk perception

- Increased regulatory period to start commercial operation
- Incentives to anticipate the entry into operation of assets
- EPE reinforced the preliminary studies for the auction to expose more clearly the social and environmental risks to which the investor who acquire certain lot would be exposed.




# Some lessons: licensing and an increasing time for construction<sup>21</sup>

## The Problem

Recurrent delays in the transmission implementation schedules have been a great concern

Average Construction Execution Time (Days)



## The Solution

### Regulatory effort to ensure efficiency in construction

- Review of penalties rules
- Improvements in inspection processes of transmission services
- Requirement of performance bonds with milestones according to the works schedule
- Preclusion of the companies that were behind schedule in the transmission auctions

# Some lessons: mismatches between G & T expansion

## The Problem

Period for the transmission system to be planned, auctioned, and start operation → **7 years**

Period for the wind and solar to be planned, and start operation → **less than 3 years**

Those 4 years of difference led to greater transmission bottlenecks, and impacting the generation expansion




## The Solution

### Proactive transmission expansion

The system planner (EPE) started to identify the most likely locations of interest of new generators and to plan the main “highways” in advance of generation with decision-making under uncertainty techniques

Identification of hotspots for generators considering land conditions, and irradiation/wind factors.



# Some lessons: de-risking ITP for financing

## Currency Risk

Contracts and long-term financing in BRL



## Volume Risk

No volume risk (energy flow or losses) is applied



## Construction Risk

Technical qualification is required, and regulator oversees the project construction evolution.



## Counterparty risk

The default rate spread out among users and default rates are below 0.25%.



## BNDES


- ✓ financing with low-cost loans in local currency;
- ✓ financing strategies, and;
- ✓ risk mitigation instruments.

## EPE

- ✓ Centralized planning process
- ✓ All information and studies to mitigate risks such as information asymmetry.

# Other ITP Experiences in LatAm


In Latin American, other countries have also current experiences with ITP models, following the same framework of Brazil






# Other ITP Experiences in LatAm: Chile

The 2016 law in Chile brought significant changes to the Transmission sector model to create an environment that fosters the development of a competitive market, facilitates the transport of energy from clean sources to consumption centers, and helps reduce energy prices for both households and businesses



# Other ITP Experiences in LatAm: Colombia

Colombia's competitive bidding process has strengthened transmission infrastructure by awarding over 70 projects with a balance of public and private participation. Clear guarantees, performance bonds, and stable 25-year revenue streams ensure financial stability, while strict penalties incentivize reliability and high operational standards



# Some common questions

**1**

**How do you guarantee that the annuity of the remuneration to the private investor will be guaranteed with a low risk?**

There is a system of guarantees (escrow accounts, etc.) that ensures the bankability of payments. The system has never had a default since the implementation of the business model. Financing has come from private lenders, debenture holders and listed companies.

**2**

**Does the fact that some transmission infrastructure is privately owned represent a security risk for the power system?**

No. The System Operator (ONS) dispatches generation and transmission resources independently of ownership.

**3**

**Has private participation in transmission made transmission more expensive than paying for it with public funds?**

No. Auctions have been competitive, financing has come from public and private lenders, and public funds, instead, have been destined to other uses.

# Some common questions

4

## **What if a transmission line already auctioned does not get implemented?**

If a previously auctioned transmission project fails, it can disrupt future planning, as new projects assume that all prior ones will be built. To manage this risk, ANEEL and EPE regularly update expansion studies and hold new auctions. If a failure occurs, the government typically re-auctions the affected projects quickly and adjusts new expansion plans to compensate for delays.

5

## **Has any player ever won the auction and then been disqualified?**

Yes. There was a notable example in June 2023, when a consortium won with bids that were up to 60% below the maximum revenue allowed. However, the consortium was disqualified by ANEEL because it failed to present the required guarantees. After this disqualification, ANEEL selected the winning bidders based on the second most competitive offers.

6

## **How are the allowed revenues (i.e., RAP) updated through the years?**

Auctioned revenue for transmission contracts is adjusted annually for inflation, with tariff reviews conducted in the 5th, 10th, and 15th years. Concession contracts clearly define which parameters are fixed and which are subject to review. While this classification can vary between auctions, once a concession contract is signed, the distinction between fixed and revisable parameters becomes final.

# Conclusion

---

- **Brazil has experience in building an extensive transmission system that allows it to integrate renewable generation and portfolio optimization**

- **In the country, the regulatory framework of the transmission business has been successful – It demands a constant balance of stronger incentives, stricter rules and solid institutions to secure the enforcement**

- **A good and strong regulatory framework combines security to investors while encouraging efficiency**

- **Private participation has always been significant in the transmission business environment**





# Thank you!

 [www.psr-inc.com](http://www.psr-inc.com)

 [psr@psr-inc.com](mailto:psr@psr-inc.com)

 +55 21 3906-2100



 /psrenergy

 @psrenergy

 /psrenergy


 @psrenergy

# Electrical International Connections

Brazil's electrical interconnections with other countries were established prior to 2000, before the sector reform, through specific bilateral agreements between the countries.



**Energy Exchange in GWh- Brazil to Argentina**



**Energy Exchange in GW- Brazil to Uruguay**

